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NOTES
Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial
Institutions: A Crisis?
Regulatory agencies' are charged with protecting the safety and
soundness of the banking industry. Despite those objectives, American
financial institutions2 are currently failing at a rate higher than at any
time since the 1930's. Today insider abuse and criminal misconduct3
contribute to a significant number of financial institution failures.
Occurrences of misconduct have risen to a level labeled by many as a
crisis. President Bush recently pledged that "we will make every effort to
recover assets diverted from these institutions and to place behind bars
those who have caused losses through criminal behavior. ' 4 Congress has
recognized the seriousness of insider abuse and criminal misconduct in
1 Various government bodies regulate financial institutions in the United States. Both commer-
cial banks and savings and loan associations may have federal or state charters. State regulatory
systems cover state chartered financial institutions, while federal agencies regulate federally
chartered institutions and some state chartered institutions. There are many jurisdictional overlaps
among federal agencies and between federal and state regulators.
This Note focuses on federal regulation. To promote efficient regulation and to minimize dupli-
cate efforts, federal banking agencies concentrate on certain institutions. The Federal Reserve Sys-
tem possesses the authority to supervise all banks which are members of that system but
concentrates its supervisory powers on state chartered member banks. N. LASH, BANKING LAws AND
REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 28 (1987). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) supervises all banks insured by it but focuses on state chartered banks which are not mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System. Id. at 29. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
supervises federally chartered or "national" banks. Id. at 26.
A similar regulatory system applies to savings and loan associations. The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB) supervises federally chartered savings and loan associations. The Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insures all federal savings and loan associations and
some state chartered associations. The FSLIC supervises insured state chartered savings and loan
associations. M. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW 2.03 (6th
ed. 1989).
2 The term "financial institutions" in this Note includes commercial banks and savings and loan
associations.
3 This Note defines insider activities as the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Mon-
etary Affairs did in its 1984 Report.
'[I]nsider abuse' ... refers to a wide range of misconduct by officers, directors and insiders
of financial institutions committed with the intent to enrich themselves without regard for
the safety and soundness of the institutions they control, in violation of civil banking laws
and regulations and perhaps also in violation of criminal banking laws. The term 'criminal
misconduct' refers strictly to criminal acts committed by such insiders against the institu-
tions they control.
H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 n.5 (1984).
4 President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at 36, col. I.
Even a coordinated federal effort may not recover a significant amount of the losses caused by in-
sider misconduct. Addressing the issue of fraud losses, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
stated that "[w]e'd be fooling ourselves to think any substantial portion of those assets are going to
be recovered, notwithstanding our best efforts." Bartlett, Savings Fraud Losses Seen As Lost For Good,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at 29, col. 3. The government can seize assets purchased with the ille-
gally obtained funds, but some funds are "simply not recoverable." Id. "In many cases, the fraud
involved investments in inflated commercial real estate that is now worthless. In addition, some
money may have been taken out of the country." Id.
financial institutions, holding hearings 5 on the subject and passing new
bank fraud legislation. 6 The United States Justice Department and the
federal banking agencies are working together to improve detection, in-
vestigation, and prosecution of insider abuse and criminal misconduct in
financial institutions.7 Despite those efforts, the problem of institution
failures caused by insider abuse and criminal misconduct remains. A co-
ordinated comprehensive approach to that problem does not exist. Ful-
5 Various congressional committees have investigated the problems of insider abuse and crimi-
nal misconduct in financial institutions. The House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs targeted this subject for study. See Examination and Supervision of Depository Institu-
tions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan.
13, 1989); Adequacy of Federal Efforts to Combat Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in Federally Insured Financial
Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Fraud and Abuse by Insiders, Borrowers, and Apprais-
ers in the California Thrift Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs
of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); Federal Response to Criminal
Misconduct By Bank Officers, Directors, and Insiders (Part 2): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Con-
sumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct by Bank Officers, Directors, and Insiders (Part 1): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, COMBATING FRAUD, ABUSE, AND
MISCONDUCT IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE INADEQUATE,
H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Additional hearings and reports concern specific financial institution failures: Golden Pacific Na-
tional Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Ohio Savings and Loan
Crisis and Collapse of ESM Government Securities, Inc.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer,
and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); Inquiry
into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Adequacy of Federal Home Loan Bank Board Supervision of Empire
Savings and Loan Association: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Federal Supervision and Failure of
United American Bank (Knoxville, Tenn.): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); Failure of Penn Square
Bank: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982); Penn Square Bank Failure: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Federal Supervision Failure of the Penn Square Bank, Oklahoma City, Okla.:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); The Failure of Citizens State Bank of Carrizo Springs, Texas, and
Related Financial Problems: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of
the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Oversight Hearings into
the Effectiveness of Federal Bank Regulation (Franklin National Bank Failure): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); Oversight Hearings into the Effectiveness of Federal Bank Regulation (Federal Home Loan Bank
Board's Supervision of Washington Federal Savings & Loan Association): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INSURANCE OF
THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., CONTINENTAL
ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK: REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO ITS FEDERAL SUPERVISION AND ASSISTANCE
(Comm. Print 1985); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD
SUPERVISION AND FAILURE OF EMPIRE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF MESQUITE, TEX., H.R. REP.
No. 953, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FEDERAL SUPER-
VISION AND FAILURE OF UNITED AMERICAN BANK IN KNOXVILLE, TENN., AND AFFILIATED BANKS, H.R.
REP. No. 573, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ADEQUACY
OF THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY'S SUPERVISION OF FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK,
H.R. REP. No. 1669, 94th cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
6 See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
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filling President Bush's pledge will require increased coordination of
federal efforts against insider abuse and criminal misconduct in financial
institutions.
This Note examines financial institution failures in Part I. Part II
discusses enforcement actions applicable to insider misconduct in the
banking industry. Part III analyzes efforts to curb insider abuse and
criminal misconduct. Part IV concludes that increased cooperation and
communication, particularly on regional and local levels, will produce a
more effective attack on insider abuse and criminal misconduct in finan-
cial institutions.
I. Failures of Financial Institutions
After thousands of banks failed during the 1920's and early 1930's,8
the annual number of bank failures plummeted. In the forty-nine years
from 1934 to 1982, only 764 banks failed.9 Recent failure rates, how-
8 The economic crisis of the 1920's forced 6000 banks to suspend operations or voluntarily
liquidate. Four thousand banks were absorbed or merged into other banks. N. LASH, supra note 1, at
10. A series of smaller banking crises occurred during the early 1930's. In December of 1930, 352
banks failed. Id. at 11. Similar crises occurred in the spring of 1931 and in 1933. The 1933 banking
crisis led President Roosevelt to close all banks for a 10 day period. Id. at 12.
The economic catastrophe in the United States from 1929 to 1933 is well known. "The number
of banks declined from 25,000 to 15,000; the money supply dropped by one-third; and unemploy-
ment rose to 25 percent of the labor force." Id.
9 C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 1983-84 at 44 (1984). "Bank
failure" statistics can be deceptive. The FDIC may pursue various actions when a bank becomes
insolvent. Those agency activities determine whether or not statistics include that institution as a
failed bank.
The Comptroller of the Currency holds the power to declare a national bank insolvent. 12
U.S.C. § 191 (1982). After determining insolvency, the Comptroller appoints the FDIC as receiver.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982). State bank chartering agencies possess the authority to declare a state
bank insolvent. After such a declaration, "[tihe FDIC may accept appointment as receiver of an
insolvent state bank, and frequently is so requested." C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, supra, at 46.
The FDIC, as receiver, may pay off insured depositors and liquidate the bank's assets. Failed
bank statistics include banks subject to deposit payoffs. Id. at 45. A deposit payoff, however, carries
several disadvantages. The community loses banking services and depositors suddenly hold frozen
accounts. Rosenberg & Given, Financially Troubled Banks: Private Solutions and Regulatory Alternatives,
104 BANKING L.J. 284, 295 n.31 (1987).
The FDIC in recent years has preferred to use purchase and assumption transactions when
banks become insolvent. Norcross, The Bank Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, The D'Oench Doctrine,
and Federal Common Law, 103 BANKING L.J. 316, 319 (1986). The FDIC, as receiver in such a
transaction,
solicits bids from other banks for the purchase of some or all of the assets of a failed bank
and the assumption of some or all of its liabilities. To the extent the assumed liabilities
exceed the purchased assets, the FDIC supplies the cash necessary to enable the assuming
bank to "cover" the assumed liabilities.
Rosenberg & Given, supra, at 295-96 (footnote omitted). The purchase and assumption transaction
avoids many of the disadvantages of deposit payoffs. The FDIC must analyze the costs of a deposit
payoff and a purchase and assumption transaction and choose the action that will be the least costly
to the insurance fund. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (1982). Failed bank statistics include banks receiving
financial assistance from the FDIC in purchase and assumption transactions. C. GOLEMBE & D. HOL-
LAND, supra, at 46.
Rather than pay off insured depositors or arrange a purchase and assumption transaction, the
FDIC may provide direct assistance to a financially troubled bank before the Comptroller declares
the bank insolvent. Unless continued operation of the troubled bank is essential to the community,
the FDIC may furnish direct assistance to a bank only when the aid is reasonably necessary to save
the cost of liquidating the bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A) (1982). Failed bank statistics do not
include banks which continue to operate after receiving FDIC assistance, regardless of the total
assistance given by the FDIC. C. GOLEMBE & D. HOLLAND, supra, at 46.
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ever, indicate an alarming trend. In 1982, forty-two banks failed. 10 The
failures increased to 138 in 1986,11 and 184 in 1987.12 The trend contin-
ues, with 200 banks failing in 1988.13
Failure rates for savings and loan associations mirror the pattern of
bank failures. From 1934 to 1979, just thirteen savings and loan associa-
tions failed and 124 institutions received assistance from the FSLIC.14
Those figures spiraled upward, with 211 institutions merged or liqui-
dated from 1981 to 1986.15 In 1987, forty-eight institutions failed or re-
ceived assistance. 16  Two-hundred-twenty-three savings and loan
institutions failed or received FSLIC assistance during 1988.17
A. Causes of Institution Failures
Several factors may contribute to the failure of a bank or savings and
loan association. A recent study of financial institution failures showed
that "[n]o one weakness caused an institution to fail."' 8 Instead, a
"combination of weaknesses" brought on failure. 19 This mingling of fac-
tors prevents specific identification of the cause for the increased number
of financial institution failures. Economists, and some banking agency
10 1986 FDIC ANN. REP. 53.
11 Id. at 8. Additionally, the FDIC provided open bank assistance to seven banks. Id.
12 1987 FDIC ANN. REP. 13. The FDIC also provided open bank assistance to 19 banks and
participated in 133 purchase and assumption transactions. Id.
13 FDIC, 1988 BANK CLOSINGS AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS MEMORANDUM. In addition to the
failed banks, the FDIC provided open bank assistance to 21 banks. Id.
14 Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of 1987: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 181 (1987) [hereinafter Recapitalization Hedings] (statement
of Frederick D. Wolf, Director, Accounting and Financial Management Division, General Accounting
Office).
When a federally chartered savings and loan association becomes insolvent, the FHLBB may
appoint the FSLIC as receiver for the institution. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(D), 1729(b) (1982). The
FHLBB may also appoint the FSLIC as receiver for a state chartered federally insured savings and
loan association. M. SCHROEDER, supra note 1, at 10.02[1].
The FSLIC, as receiver of an institution, may take actions necessary to return the loan associa-
tion to a sound solvent condition. The FSLIC may merge the insolvent institution with another
insured loan association or the FSLIC may take over the insolvent association's assets and operate
the institution. The law also authorizes the FSLIC to liquidate the insolvent institution's assets. 12
U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1)(A) (1982). See M. SCHROEDER, supra note 1, at 10.02[3][b]. If the FSLIC
liquidates an institution's assets, the insurance fund pays off depositors up to the statutory insurance
limit. Id.
Statistics indicate that "the financially assisted merger is the FSLIC's front defense against de-
fault." McGuirk, Default Prevention, Financial Analysis and Modeling: The FSLIC Perspective, 16 FED.
HOME LOAN BANK BOARDJ., Oct. 1983, at 10. See generally FED. HOME LOAN BANK SYS., A GUIDE TO
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM 49-54 (1987) (discussion of FSLIC's alternatives for handling
insolvent institutions).
15 Recapitalization Hearings, supra note 14, at 182. During that same time period, the number of
insolvent savings and loan associations escalated from 16 in 1980 to 445 insolvent institutions by
September of 1986. Id.
16 1987 FHLBB ANN. REP. 11.
17 Telephone interview with David Barr, Public Information Officer of the FHLBB (Feb. 6,
1989). In 1988, the FSLIC liquidated 26 savings and loan associations, arranged 179 assisted merg-
ers or acquisitions and stabilized (granted financial assistance to) 18 institutions. Id.
18 Examination and Supervision of Depository Institutions: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearing] (unpub-
lished statement of Frederick D. Wolf, Director, General Accounting Office, Accounting and Finan-
cial Management Division, at 12) (statement on file at Notre Dame Law Review).
19 Id.
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leaders, point to the economy as the major cause of failures. Institution
failures increased at the same time that economic problems developed in
agriculture, energy, and real estate. Some interpret that information as
evidence that economic conditions caused the increase in financial insti-
tution failures. 20
A recent study by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency re-
futes the claim that economic conditions cause many financial institution
failures. 21 The study indicates that most banks fail because of capital de-
pletion, usually produced by poor asset quality.22 When investigating
the factors contributing to poor asset quality, the OCC found that ad-
verse economic conditions make it more difficult for a bank to be profita-
ble but those conditions rarely cause a bank to fail. The economy was a
significant factor in thirty-five percent of the bank failures, but economic
20 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FAC-
TORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS, at Introduction (1988) [hereinafter OCC
STUDY]. Federal regulators claim that fraud presents a "minor issue compared with the collapse of
oil prices and real estate values in Texas and Oklahoma." Rosenblatt, GAO Cites Fraud in Failures ofrS
& L s; Official Calls iVisconduct Rampant in Troubled Firms Examined by Agency, Los Angeles Times, Jan.
14, 1989, at I, col. 5.
General disagreement exists concerning the causes of bank and savings and loan association
failures. Federal regulatory agencies do not agree with each other as to the effect of insider miscon-
duct and other conditions. The Justice Department noted that federal banking agencies believe fac-
tors other than insider misconduct are the primary cause of failures. The agencies cited factors such
as "careless management or poor economic conditions." Adequacy of Federal Efforts to Combat Fraud,
Abuse, and Misconduct in Federally Insured Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 941
(1987). [hereinafter November 1987 Hearing].
Some federal banking agencies also reveal internal disagreement concerning the effects of crimi-
nal misconduct. The FHLBB continues to blame economic conditions, but some employees reject
that idea. A FHLBB Field Manager for Investigations expressed the following view:
It is my opinion that Insider Abuse, not economic problems, is the major factor which has
eroded the funds of the FSLIC to insolvency. Even now it may be too late to stop the
bleeding, but where there is life there is hope. If the FSLIC recapitalization succeeds in
saving the agency and industry, I can think of no way of preventing another massive scam of
the FSLIC funds without a major focus at every [savings and loan association] to address
fraud and Insider Abuse as soon as it is suspected, rather than waiting for an institution's
insolvency.
H.R. REP. No. 1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1988) (footnote omitted).
21 The OCC examined the "relative roles of external economic difficulties and internal manage-
ment factors in determining a bank's success or failure." OCC STUDY, supra note 20, at Introduction.
The study found that the actions of a bank's management wield the greatest influence on whether a
bank fails.
The OCC's study is based on an analysis of banks that failed, became problems and recov-
ered, or remained healthy during the period 1979 through 1987. The OCC analyzed 171
failed banks to identify characteristics and conditions present when the banks deteriorated.
The OCC also evaluated a sample of 51 rehabilitated banks in similar circumstances that
experienced significant difficulties from which they recovered. These rehabilitated banks'
composite CAMEL ratings moved from a I or a 2, to a 4 or a 5, and then returned to a I or
a 2, during the 1979 through 1987 period. The OCC evaluated these banks to identify
characteristics and conditions present when they became problem banks, and again to iden-
tify the characteristics and conditions present when they returned to health. Finally, the
OCC evaluated a sample of 38 healthy banks that maintained composite CAMEL ratings of
I or 2 throughout the period. The healthy banks served as a control group against which
the OCC compared the groups that experienced problems.
OCC STUDY, supra note 20, at 3. CAMEL ratings provide a uniform rating system indicating the
overall condition of banks. For an explanation of CAMEL ratings, see infra note 103.
22 OCC STUDY, supra note 20, at 5.
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conditions were the "sole significant cause of failure" in just seven per-
cent of the banks that failed.23
The OCC found that internal problems constituted the "common
denominator" among failed and problem banks. 24 The actions and capa-
bilities of a bank's management and board of directors appeared as the
usual internal problems. Insider abuse was a significant factor in thirty-
five percent of the bank failures; fraud had a similar effect on eleven per-
cent of the failed banks.25 None of the healthy banks studied by the OCC
contained significant insider abuse or fraud. 26 The OCC concluded that
"strong management and systems can prevent failure and promote re-
covery even during difficult economic times." 27
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) recently completed re-
views of savings and loan association and bank failures.28 The Director
of the GAO Accounting and Financial Management Division commented
on the reviews' findings, noting that "[s]ome within the financial institu-
tions industry have expressed the view that the unprecedented problems
and resultant failures are largely due to economic downturns in certain
regions. However, both of our reviews lead to a different conclusion." 29
Like the OCC Study, the GAO reviews found that "well-managed institu-
tions with strong internal controls" can continue successful operation
even in areas experiencing economic problems.30
The GAO uncovered high levels of insider abuse and fraud. Using
the FHLBB's definitions,3 1 the GAO found that "fraud or insider abuse
existed at each and every one of the failed thrifts." 32 The control group
23 Id. at 10. Interestingly, economic conditions significantly contributed to the problems of
more banks that eventually recovered than banks that failed. Sixteen percent of the rehabilitated
banks recovered while operating in "significantly depressed" economies while an additional 67%
recovered in areas experiencing "marginally depressed" economies. Id.
24 Id. at Introduction.
25 Id. at 9. The study identified insider abuse as "self-dealing, undue dependence on the bank
for income or services by a board member or shareholder, inappropriate transactions with affiliates,
or unauthorized transactions by management officials." Id.
26 Id. at 13.
27 Id. at 12.
28 1989 Hearing, supra note 18. The GAO
analyzed examination reports and other related supervisory documentation for failed thrifts
and banks to determine whether such institutions are characterized by conditions or operat-
ing practices that distinguish them from healthy institutions. In addition, [the GAO] inter-
viewed numerous regulatory and industry officials, attorneys, and others knowledgeable
about the thrifts and banks. [The GAO] also examined the role which insider abuse and
fraud as well as environmental factors, primarily economic conditions, played in these
failures.
Id. at 10. The GAO expects to release its report on the reviews in the spring of 1989.
The GAO review of savings and loan associations covered 26 institutions "which FSLIC either
began assisting between January 1, 1985, and September 30, 1987, or anticipated assisting as of
September 30, 1987." Id. The GAO staff compared that sample group of institutions to a control
group of "similar, but solvent" savings and loan associations. Id.
29 Id. at 11.
30 Id.
31 The FHLBB defines insider abuse and fraud to include "breaches of fiduciary duty, self-deal-
ing, engaging in high-risk speculative ventures, excessive expenditures and compensation, and con-
flicts of interest, among other activities." Id. at 21.
32 Id. at 13. The GAO found allegations of criminal misconduct in 19 of the 26 savings and loan
associations. Mr. Wolf's testimony indicated that there may have been additional criminal allega-
tions to which the GAO had no access. Id.
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of healthy savings and loan associations possessed "significantly fewer
internal control weaknesses than failed institutions. ' 33 The healthy insti-
tutions complied with laws and regulations. 34
Failed banks in the GAO review also contained insider abuse and
fraud. Sixty-four percent of the failed banks studied by the GAO re-
vealed insider abuse.3 5 Insider fraud was present in thirty-eight percent
of the failed banks.3 6 The GAO listed a lack of significant insider abuse
or fraud as a characteristic distinguishing healthy savings and loan as-
sociations and banks from institutions that failed.37
A congressional study also linked insider abuse and criminal miscon-
duct to financial institution failures. 38 That study concluded that approx-
imately fifty percent of all bank failures "are caused, in large part, by the
criminal misconduct of officers, directors and insiders."' 39 Insider crimi-
nal misconduct, according to the congressional study, causes approxi-
mately twenty-five percent of savings and loan association failures. 40
Those figures, although high, do not include insider abuse that fell short
of criminal misconduct.
Failures connected directly or indirectly to insider abuse or criminal
misconduct are not a new occurrence. The percentage of such failures,
however, is increasing. An FDIC study of bank failures from 1960 to
1974 found approximately thirty percent of the failures caused by crimi-
nal misconduct, "defalcation, embezzlement, and manipulation.- 41 The
FDIC statistics for bank failures from 1980 to 1983 reveal criminal mis-
conduct as a "major contributing factor" in forty-five percent of the fail-
ures. 42 An even stronger link exists between insider activities and
financial institution failures when instances of insider abuse are added to
the criminal misconduct figures.
Although it is clear that insider abuse and criminal misconduct play a
significant role in institution failures, exact causation statistics are diffi-
cult to determine. Insider misconduct may directly cause an institution
33 Id. at 28.
34 Id. at 13.
35 Id. at 21. The GAO staff reviewed the 184 FDIC insured banks that closed in 1987. Id. at 10.
36 Id. at 21.
37 Id. at 29.
38 In an effort to determine the impact of insider activities on institution failures, the Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions (the subcommittee) studied bank and loan association failures between 1980 and 1983. The
subcommittee analyzed the 75 banks insured by the FDIC that failed between January 1, 1980 and
June 17, 1983. It also analyzed the 30 savings and loan associations that the FHLBB placed in
involuntary receivership between January 1980 and July 1983. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OP-
ERATIONS, FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCONDUCT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION'S FINAN-
CIAL INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1137, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
REPORT].
39 Id. at 30. The subcommittee based that conclusion on its own finding that 61% of the failures
involved insider criminal misconduct and the FDIC's estimate that criminal misconduct served as a
major contributing factor in 45% of the failures. Id. at 29-30.
40 The subcommittee approved the 25% figure after it had identified criminal misconduct as a
major cause in 36% of the loan association failures for 1980-83, while the FHLBB estimated the
number at 23%. Id.
41 Id. at 29. That FDIC study indicated that an additional 53.8% of the failures were caused by
insider abuse: "self-serving loans to bank management or friends of management." Id.
42 Id. at 30.
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to fail, but often the misconduct alone would not bring about failure.
Capital depletion caused by insider misconduct generally combines with
other factors, such as economic problems, to lead to insolvency.43 Eco-
nomic problems may help to reveal insider abuse or criminal misconduct.
Although some financial frauds clearly would collapse and become ex-
posed under their own weight due to the lack of sophistication of those
who perpetuated the frauds or because of the inherent weaknesses
built into the schemes themselves, many other frauds would yet re-
main unexposed but for an economic crisis which accelerated, facili-
tated, and precipitated their detection. 44
In the words of bank investigators, "[fjrauds are easy to hide when prof-
its are good."4 5
B. Costs of Institution Failures
Regardless of the specific contribution of misconduct to each failure,
insider abuse or criminal misconduct plays a role in a significant number
of financial institution failures. Those insider activities carry huge costs.
Estimates of the dollar costs vary. Investigators calculate bank fraud
losses for the 1970's at less than $1.5 billion.46 After congressional in-
quiries, the FDIC and FSLIC estimated that the insurance funds lost
more than $1 billion from institution failures between 1980 and 1983
where criminal misconduct was a major contributing factor.47
The most recent statistics reveal loss figures that continue to grow.
The FDIC lost $676 million from 1985 through the first half of 1987 due
to bank failures where insider misconduct was a significant contributing
factor.48 The FSLIC will lose at least $12 billion from institutions that
failed or became insolvent between 1984 and mid-1987 where miscon-
duct contributed to the insolvency.49
The dollar amounts alone are staggering, but the costs of insider
abuse and criminal misconduct extend beyond those figures. Economists
view the safety and soundness of the banking system as a necessary
component of a stable economy.50 Thus, excessive failures affect the
43 1989 Hearing, supra note 18, at 13.
44 November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 27 (statement of Henry Oncken, U.S. Attorney,
Southern District of Texas).
45 McCoy, Financial Frau&d: Theories Behind Nationwide Surge in Bank Swindles, Wall. St. J., Oct. 2,
1987, at 15, col. 4.
46 Id. The FBI adds loss figures when an investigation closes. Because investigations may con-
tinue through several years, the FBI's figures for the 1970's are not yet complete and involve some
estimation. Id.
47 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 28. That figure indicates total losses from the failures con-
nected to criminal misconduct, not just the losses "attributable solely to criminal misconduct." Id.
48 November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 638.
49 HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, COMBATING FRAUD, ABUSE, AND MISCONDUCT IN
THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE INADEQUATE, H.R. REP. No.
1088, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 REPORT]. The FSLIC did not willingly
release those huge loss figures. After the first loss figures provided by the FHLBB were suspiciously
low, the subcommittee investigated and found the reported figures. The FHLBB's reluctance to
reveal the actual loss figures was attributed to a feeling that such disclosure "could not help the
industry and could possibly be 'inflammatory.' " Id. at 55.
50 A sound banking system protects individual depositors, prevents bank failures and avoids
disruptions in the money supply. J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 2.06 (1987).
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strength of the banking system and the economy. Widespread financial
institution failures in the past resulted in national recessions and contrac-
tions of the money supply. 51 Although the tangible effects of the current
situation may not have reached those proportions yet, failures caused by
insider abuse and criminal misconduct weaken public confidence in the
banking system and ultimately weaken the economy. 52 Regulators still
fear the possible consequences of widespread failures.
II. Enforcement Actions
Maintaining the safety and soundness of the financial system
requires taking action against those responsible for insider abuse and
criminal misconduct. The current legal and administrative framework
provides for sanctions against the perpetrators of insider misconduct.
Regulatory agencies may pursue civil enforcement actions against finan-
cial institutions and individuals. The agencies may initiate civil litigation
against individuals in an effort to recover damages for losses incurred by
failed financial institutions. Individuals may also face criminal charges
for misconduct.
A. Civil Actions
In the past, banking agencies used informal actions to correct mis-
conduct and unsafe or unsound practices. 53 When informal action
ceased to be effective, Congress expanded the disciplinary powers of the
banking agencies. 54 Currently, the agencies possess the authority to pur-
sue the following civil enforcement actions: formal agreements, 55 cease
51 N. LASH, supra note 1, at 23.
52 November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 530 (statement of William F. Weld, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Criminal Division).
53 "Moral suasion, 'jawboning,' and, if necessary, pressure were used to solve problems without
having to resort to formal enforcement actions." 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 143. Regulators
resolved problems with persuasive discussions or letters, practices that have been called "regulation
by raised eyebrow." Hawke, Assuring Safety and Soundness: The Role of the Enforcement Process, 5 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 167 (1986).
54 The Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA) authorized the federal banking
agencies to take the following actions: issue cease and desist orders, require completion of certain
actions, issue prohibition orders and remove officers or directors. Financial Institutions Supervisory
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, 80 Stat. 1028. See Huber, Enforcement Powers of Federal Banking
Agencies, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 123, 133-40 (1988).
Regulatory enforcement authority expanded again with passage of the Financial Institutions
Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA). Financial Institutions Regulatory and
Interest Rate Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 95 Stat. 3641. Banking agencies gained the
power to issue cease and desist orders against officers, directors, and insiders. (FISA allowed such
orders only against institutions.) FIRA also granted authority to issue civil money penalties and
broadened the agencies' power to remove or suspend officers and directors. See Huber, supra, at
140-47.
55 Formal agreements, or memoranda of understanding, represent the mildest type of formal
action. The person involved in the misconduct voluntarily enters into a written agreement with the
banking agency. 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 145. The agency generally cannot enforce an agree-
ment in court, but violations of a written agreement provide grounds for a cease and desist order. A.
POLLARDJ. PASSAICJR., X. ELLIS, &J. DALY, BANKING LAw IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.8 (1988) [here-
inafter A. POLLARD]. "Agreements with individuals ... are relatively quick and painless ways for the
agencies to address problems of insider abuse without stigmatizing the entire institution or going
through the agencies' cumbersome procedures to issue a cease and desist order or impose civil
money penalties." 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 145.
[Vol. 64:222
NOTES
and desist orders, 56 civil money penalties,5 7 suspensions, and removals.58
The banking agencies as a group have not consistently or vigorously
used the civil enforcement actions available to them. In 1984, the sub-
committee concluded that "[t]he banking agencies often fail to take di-
rect civil enforcement action against individuals engaged in insider
abuse, notwithstanding a clear statutory responsibility to do so." 59 Link-
ing the enforcement action statistics to the congressional study of failed
institutions, the subcommittee found that "where the likelihood of crimi-
nal misconduct by insiders was high or where the agencies themselves
had made criminal referrals involving insiders, the agencies took direct
enforcement action against individuals in only thirty percent of the
cases."
6 0
56 Cease and desist orders provide a more powerful enforcement measure than formal agree-
ments. The orders can mandate termination of practices and require affirmative steps to correct
problems. Huber, supra note 54, at 133. Cease and desist orders are legally enforceable; the
charged party possesses the right to an administrative hearing. A. POLLARD, supra note 55, at § 5.2.
Banking agencies may issue cease and desist orders when an institution or individual engages in an
unsafe or unsound practice or violates a law, rule, regulation or written agreement. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1464(d)(2), 1730(e), 1818(b) (1982).
Banking agencies may issue temporary cease and desist orders in certain emergency situations.
Temporary orders are appropriate when the practices in question "are likely to cause insolvency or
substantial dissipation of assets or earnings of the institution or generally to weaken the condition of
the institution or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of depositors." A. POLLARD, supra note
55, at § 5.2. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(3), 1730(f), 1818(c) (1982).
57 Federal banking agencies received the power to issue civil money penalties under FIRA in
1978. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(8)(B), 1730(k)(3), 1818(i)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congress
characterized civil money penalties as intermediate actions, more severe than informal actions or
written agreements, but less drastic than cease and desist orders. 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at
146.
Banking agencies may assess civil money penalties against financial institutions and institution
directors, officers, employees and agents. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(8)(B), 1730(k)(3), 1818(i)(2)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Violating certain statutes or cease and desist orders subjects an institution
or individual to possible penalties. A. POLLARD, supra note 55, at § 5.4. Each banking agency pos-
sesses different authority to assess civil money penalties for statutory violations. See 1984 REPORT,
supra note 38, at 147-48; A. POLLARD, supra note 55, at § 5.4.
58 Regulatory agencies may suspend or remove directors, officers, employees or individuals in-
volved in a financial institution's affairs. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(4), 1730(g),(h), 1818(e),(g)
(1982). The following actions may result in suspension or removal: violating a law, rule, regulation,
or cease and desist order; engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or breaching a fiduciary duty;
engaging in actions that have caused or will cause substantial loss to the institution; acting with
personal dishonesty; demonstrating willful or continuing disregard for the institution's safety and
soundness. See id. The subcommittee noted that the statutory requirements for suspension and
removal "reach only the most egregious cases of abusive conduct." 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at
149.
59 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 152. The subcommittee analyzed civil enforcement actions
taken against institutions and individuals from 1980 to 1983. The statistics show actions taken by
the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC and FHLBB. The figures include the following actions: formal
agreements; cease and desist orders; civil money penalties; and removals, suspensions and prohibi-
tions.
In 1980, all four banking agencies pursued a total ofjust 23 actions against individuals. Id. at
154-55. That figure increased to 34 in 1981, 158 the next year and 224 in 1984. Id. An increase in
civil money penalties issued by the OCC and FDIC accounted for the greater number of actions
against individuals. Id. at 153.
The OCC most vigorously pursued civil enforcement actions against individuals, taking 270
actions during the four year period of 1980 to 1983. Id. at 156. The FDIC pursued 114 actions
during that time, while the FHLBB instituted 44 actions. The Federal Reserve took action against
individuals only 11 times in four years. Id.
60 Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
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Federal banking agencies' civil enforcement actions since 1984 have
improved in some respects and deteriorated in others. In 1984, the sub-
committee recommended increased use of civil enforcement actions
against individuals involved in insider abuse.6 1 The agencies' adherence
to that recommendation varies. The OCC has been the most diligent of
the agencies in this area;62 the FDIC holds the poorest record.63
In the 1988 Report, the subcommittee noted the "mixed" record of
recent years. 64 The subcommittee recommended that the FDIC and the
Federal Reserve "substantially increase their use of civil enforcement ac-
tions against officers, directors, employees, or other insiders engaged in
unsafe and unsound practices, abusive actions, serious violations of regu-
lations, and other misconduct." 65
Although some agencies have increased enforcement actions against
individuals, all banking agencies have reduced the number of civil en-
forcement actions taken against institutions since 1984.66 The subcom-
mittee in its 1988 Report recommended that all four federal agencies
(OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC and FHLBB) "substantially increase" utili-
zation of civil enforcement actions against institutions.67
Several factors contribute to the continuing problems associated
with civil enforcement actions against individuals and institutions. Key
policy disputes have led to the inconsistent use of certain types of civil
61 Id. at 22-23.
62 The OCC brought 779 civil enforcement actions against individuals during the four year pe-
riod of 1984 to 1987. 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 75.
63 During the four years from 1984 to 1987, the FDIC pursued only 444 enforcement actions
against individuals. Id. The agency's actions jumped from 75 in 1984 to 260 in 1985, but then
declined to 49 in 1986 and 32 in 1987. Id.
The FDIC took action less than 450 times although it supervised 8,240 state nonmember banks.
In contrast, the OCC supervised approximately 4,900 national banks and pursued over 775 enforce-
ment actions during the same time period. Id. at 76. The few FDIC enforcement actions do not
correspond to a lower level of misconduct. From 1985 through mid-1987, "almost two-thirds of all
failed banks where misconduct, insider abuse, or fraud was present were state nonmember banks."
Id.
64 The OCC supervised approximately 4,900 national banks and pursued 779 enforcement ac-
tions against individuals from 1984 to 1987. The OCC brought 129 actions in 1984, 225 actions in
1985, 235 in 1986, and 190 in 1987. Id. at 75-76.
The Federal Reserve Board supervised 1,100 state member banks. The Board pursued 18 en-
forcement actions in 1984 against individuals associated with those banks. Federal Reserve Board
enforcement actions increased to 35 in 1985, but fell to 9 in 1986 and 8 in 1987. Id.
The FHLBB supervised 3,250 institutions and increased its enforcement actions each year. In
1984, the FHLBB brought 27 actions. That number increased to 49 in 1985, 57 in 1986, and 59 in
1987. Id. Although the raw figures seem small, the FHLBB possesses a more limited authority to
issue civil money penalties. The FHLBB used the removal and suspension powers "almost as fre-
quently as the OCC and more frequently than the other agencies." Id. at 76.
For FDIC enforcement action statistics, see supra note 63.
65 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 25.
66 The OCC brought 391 civil enforcement actions against institutions in 1984, 426 the next
year and 371 in 1986. The OCC pursued only 141 actions against institutions in 1987. Id. at 76.
Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board took 175 enforcement actions against institutions in 1984,
255 actions in 1985 and 278 in 1986, but only 121 in 1987. Id.
The FHLBB followed the pattern. It pursued 129 civil enforcement actions against institutions
in 1984, 247 in 1985, 261 in 1986, followed by just 132 in 1987. Id.
Civil enforcement actions by the FDIC against institutions numbered 501 in 1984 and 599 in
1985. The actions decreased to 563 in 1986 and 480 in 1987. Id.
67 Id. at 25.
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enforcement actions. 68 Collection of civil money penalties varies greatly
among the banking agencies. 69 The subcommittee also found that the
heads of the federal banking agencies, particularly the FDIC and OCC,
have failed to demonstrate a firm commitment to civil enforcement
actions.70
In addition to civil enforcement actions, the FDIC and FSLIC may
pursue civil litigation against directors, officers and other individuals af-
ter a financial institution fails. 71 Those suits are classified as "recovery
actions" or "collection efforts" rather than enforcement procedures.7 2
68 Once a financial institution has failed, the FDIC and FHLBB prefer to bring civil suits seeking
damages from individual officers and directors. Those agencies, as receivers, try to recover the max-
imum amount possible for the institution. Damages from civil suits add to the institution's assets
and reduce the potential insurance claims that must be paid by the FDIC and FSLIC. 1984 REPORT,
supra note 38, at 157. In the words of former FDIC Chairman Isaac,
our strongest enforcement action against individuals who cause serious problems in banks
would be in the area of failed bank activity. Whenever a bank fails, you can bet your house
that we are going to be suing the officers and directors, the accounting firm, and others that
were involved in that bank.
Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct By Bank Officers, Directors, and Insiders (Part 2): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 532-33 (1984), quoted in 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 158.
Civil money penalties, however, are paid into the United States Treasury. 1984 REPORT, supra
note 38, at 157. The OCC advocates assessing civil money penalties against individuals, even after a
financial institution has failed. C. Todd Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, noted the awkward-
ness of the opposing views of the FDIC and the OCC. Id. at 158.
69 Actual collection rates of assessed civil money penalties vary a great deal. The FDIC seems to
experience particular difficulties in collecting. For penalties assessed from 1984 to 1986, the FDIC
had 79.1%o uncollected when open institutions were involved and 97.9% uncollected for failed insti-
tutions. Id. at 84.
During the same time period, the OCC collected all but 27y of the civil money penalties. Id.
The Federal Reserve Board has a single $50,000 penalty outstanding. Id.
70 FDIC personnel told the subcommittee's staff "why the FDIC less frequently pursues vigor-
ous civil enforcement action." 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 82. Individuals noted that
[d]uring a series of meetings with FDIC staff at headquarters and in regional offices after he
became FDIC Chairman, Mr. Seidman indicated a change in tone and direction. Rather
than the "confrontational" approach of former FDIC Chairman Isaac, Mr. Seidman articu-
lated a more congenial and accommodating FDIC approach to the industry. Reforming and
helping the industry became the FDIC's primary goal; efforts against insider abuse were not
to be ignored, but they would not have the priority that they once did. During these meet-
ings with FDIC staff, just after Mr. Seidman took over the chairmanship of the FDIC in
1985, he routinely made the following statements: "bankers are our friends"; "the FDIC
should be a friend of the industry"; and it should be like a "trade association" for the
industry. To FDIC staff, the message was clear: "Go easy on this industry."
Id. at 82-83. Chairman Seidman's policies have had a "chilling effect" on civil enforcement actions.
Id. at 83.
Similar problems exist at the OCC. Comptroller of the Currency Clarke has displayed less than
enthusiastic support for civil enforcement actions. See id. at 83-84.
71 The status of the FDIC and FSLIC as regulators and insurers of financial institutions allows
the agencies to bring the civil suits.
As insurers of financial institutions, the FDIC and FSLIC regularly become assignees or
subrogees of claims of failed institutions in connection with payment of assistance to a
third-party acquirer of the institution. In addition, as receivers or conservators of insolvent
institutions, they are in a position to pursue causes of action that belong to the institution.
Vartanian & Schley, Bank Officer and Director Liability - Regulatory Actions, 39 Bus. LAw. 1021, 1028
(1984).
Banks continuing to operate may bring civil litigation suits in their own right against individuals
involved in abusive practices.
72 Stewart, Enforcement Actions Against Officers and Directors: The Regulator's Approach (Supervisor En-
forcement Tools: C & D Actions, Civil Litigation), 51 LEGAL BULL. 67, 68 (1985). Banking agencies use
civil suits primarily to seek recovery of the money lost by the agency during an assistance transaction
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Agency suits against individuals often assert claims of common law fraud,
negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of banking statutes
and civil RICO.73 Financial Institution Bonds (Bankers Blanket Bonds)74
or directors and officers liability insurance policies generally cover the
claims against individuals. 75 The FDIC and FSLIC are also bringing an
increasing number of civil suits against accountants, attorneys and other
professionals associated with failed financial institutions. 76
B. Criminal Actions
Banking agencies possess no authority to prosecute individuals on
criminal charges; agency personnel must refer suspected criminal con-
duct in financial institutions to the United States Department ofJustice.77
or liquidation of a financial institution. The suits may also have some deterrent effect on insiders at
other financial institutions. Id.
73 See, e.g., FDIC v. Antonio, 843 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1988); FSLIC v. Shearson-American Ex-
press, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Puerto Rico 1987); FDIC v. Hardin, 608 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn.
1985) (civil RICO suits). See generally Galbraith & Seidel, FDIC Vs. Imprudent Banking Officials: The
Enforcement Apparatus, 104 BANKING L.J. 92, 120-26 (1987); Note, When Change Meets Tradition: The
Paradox of Thrift Director Liability, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 413, 439-40 (1987) (general discussions of
banking agency civil suits against individuals); U.S. DEPARTMENT OFJUsTICE, CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL
FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1988); Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980) (general discussions
of civil RICO suits).
FDIC and FSLIC often settle claims against directors and officers before going to trial. The
agencies frequently negotiate settlements with the insurer providing the directors and officers liabil-
ity insurance policies in effect when the financial institution failed. Skillern, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Failed Bank: The Past Decade (Part II), 99 BANKING L.J. 292, 310 (1982). For direc-
tors and officers liability insurance coverage of civil RICO claims, see Ichel & Thompson, Directors'
and Officers' Insurance Coverage: An Overview and Current Issues, in PRACTISING LAW INsTrrIE, SECURi-
TIES LITIGATION 257, 319-35 (1987).
74 Financial Institution Bonds or Bankers Blanket Bonds provide fidelity insurance coverage to
financial institutions for "loss resulting directly from dishonest or fraudulent acts of an employee
committed alone or in collusion with others." Ichel & Thompson, supra note 73, at 340. That pro-
tection includes losses from "embezzlement, larceny, breach of duty, personal dishonesty, wrongful
extraction and willful misapplication." J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, supra note 50, § 6.03[2]. To re-
cover from the bond provider, the financial institution (or the agency bringing the claim) must prove
that the loss was due to the dishonesty of an insured employee. Id. See generally Neel, Financial
Institution and Fidelity Coverage for Loan Losses, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 590, 605-10 (1986); Skillern, supra
note 73, at 307-10.
The provisions of Bankers Blanket Bonds generally state that an insurer who pays on the loss is
subrogated to the claims that the insured institution possesses against third parties. Bond insurers
may file subrogation claims against bank directors, alleging that the directors failed to adequately
supervise the employee whose dishonest conduct resulted in the loss. Those claims against financial
institution directors may trigger directors and officers liability insurance coverage for the directors
involved. Ichel & Thompson, supra note 73, at 341.
75 Directors and officers liability insurance policies cover "defense costs and liabilities incurred
by insured directors and officers arising out of claims alleging that an insured executive has commit-
ted 'wrongful acts.' " Ichel & Thompson, supra note 73, at 259. Each policy defines the included
"wrongful acts." Policies generally cover only conduct by an insured director or officer acting in his
or her capacity as a director or officer. Id. at 269. Certain notice requirements and exclusions apply
to insurance coverage. See generally id. at 257-344 (overview of directors and officers insurance
coverage).
76 The FSLIC greatly increased civil suits against law firms, accounting firms and appraisal firms
involved with the many savings and loan institutions that failed in Texas. Kahler, Justice Assembles
Team to Probe Texas Thrifts, Legal Times, Aug. 10, 1987, at 8, col. 1. The deputy general counsel of
the FSLIC noted that "when there is a failure and money is lost, we have a fiduciary duty to recover
as much money as possible, so we are looking at everyone who is responsible for the loss. The cases
coming up now are for malpractice and we will go after it where it occurs." Id.
77 See infra notes 108 to 111 and accompanying text.
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The Justice Department, with investigatory help from the FBI, prose-
cutes such cases.
Federal prosecutors may bring a variety of criminal charges against
insiders suspected of misconduct in financial institutions. Certain federal
statutes specifically refer to offenses against financial institutions: bank
bribery,78 misapplication of bank funds, 79 false entries in bank records,80
and receipt of stolen bank property.8 ' In the past, those statutes did not
adequately address the misconduct occurring in financial institutions.8 2
The subcommittee, in its 1984 Report, termed the criminal statutes in
this area "archaic."8' 3 Congress responded to the need for statutory im-
provement by enacting the bank related provisions of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1984.84
That Act included a new statute concerning fraud against federally
chartered or insured financial institutions.8 5 The fraud statute prohibits
78 18 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. IV 1986). The bank bribery provisions prohibit giving, offering or
promising anything of value to any person with intent to influence or reward an officer, director,
employee, agent or attorney of a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The
statute also applies to specified insiders who solicit, accept, or agree to accept anything of value with
an intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with a transaction. 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986). The bank bribery provisions apply to FDIC insured banks and FSLIC insured
savings and loan associations. 18 U.S.C. § 215(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
79 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1982).' The statute prohibits an officer, director, agent, employee of, or
individual connected in any capacity with, a federally insured bank from embezzling, purloining or
willfully misapplying the bank's funds. Id. To prove that a defendant violated that section, the pros-
ecutor must show
1) that the accused was an officer, director, or employee of the bank; 2) that the bank was in
some way connected with a nationally or federally insured bank; 3) that the accused willfully
misapplied the funds of the bank; and 4) that the accused acted with the intent to injure or
defraud the bank.
Jorgensen, White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, Embezzlement, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 513, 518
(1987). Section 657 of title 18 covers the same conduct in federally insured credit institutions, in-
cluding savings and loan associations. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1982).
80 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1006 (1982). Section 1005 prohibits a person from making false entries in
bank books, reports, or statements with an intent to injure or defraud the bank or to deceive a bank
officer or examiner. See 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982). Section 1006 applies to false entries in the books,
reports or statements of savings and loan associations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (1982). The intent
requirement differs between the two sections. See infra note 82.
81 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This section prohibits a person who knows
property has been stolen from receiving, possessing, concealing, selling or disposing of property
stolen from a bank or loan association. See infra note 90 (discussion of 1984 amendment).
82 The bank bribery statute addressed the receipt of something of value by a bank officer, direc-
tor or insider in order to procure a loan, but the provision did not apply to the payment of bribes or
kickbacks. See 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 121. For amendments to the bank bribery statute, see
infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
The misapplication of bank funds statute engenders interpretation problems. Juries struggle to
understand instructions defining "misapply" and federal judges interpret the term differently among
federal circuits. Id. at 119.
The provisions covering false entries in bank records, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005, 1006 (1982), differ in
the state-of-mind required of the defendant. When prosecuting for false entries in bank records, the
government must show an "intent to injure or to defraud." 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982). Section 1006
applies to savings and loan association records, but that section requires that the defendant pos-
sessed an "intent to deceive." 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (1982). The subcommittee noted that no reason
supports the government's differing burdens. 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 122.
83 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 118. The Department ofJustice and the federal banking agen-
cies found those criminal statutes inadequate. Id. The subcommittee concluded that "[t]he criminal
statutes relating to insider loans, bank bribery, and bank fraud are archaic and do not satisfactorily
address the types of 20th Century schemes uncovered in modern bank fraud investigations." Id.
84 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
85 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. IV 1986).
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schemes to defraud those institutions and schemes to obtain money or
property owned or controlled by such institutions.8 6 Prosecutors re-
ceived additional authority for actions to stop fraudulent schemes while
an investigation continues.8 7
The 1984 Act also amended various banking provisions. The Act
modified the bank bribery statute, expanding the list of potential defend-
ants to include the person who offers or pays the bribe as well as the
person who receives the bribe.88 The revised bank bribery provision
"deals with all facets of bank bribery and provides for felony as well as
misdemeanor prosecution, depending upon the amount involved."89
Provisions concerning receipt of stolen bank property were also
amended.90
In addition to banking statutes, prosecutors may use general federal
statutes in cases involving criminal misconduct in financial institutions.
Prosecutors continue to use federal statutes for mail fraud,9' wire
86 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
87 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. IV 1986). Section 1345 authorizes prosecutors to bring a civil action
in federal court seeking an injunction against a person engaged or about to engage in a fraudulent
act. Id.
88 18 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. IV 1986). Prior to the amendment, the bank bribery provisions only
applied to the recipient of the bribe.
89 diGenova & Belfiore, An Overview of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984- The Prosecutor's
Perspective, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 707, 731 (1985).
The 1984 bank bribery statute amendment created confusion over the conduct prohibited by
the provision. Commentators posed a hypothetical scenario:
[I]t would be a felony for a corporation to host a weekend at an expensive resort or hunting
lodge to discuss specific or general future financing plans, and to invite the banker, the
lawyer, the investment banker, the CPA, etc. To avoid prosecution, the banker would have
to pay his own way.
Dennis & Chafetz, The New Bank Bribery Act:A Trap Forthe Unwary, 102 BANKING L.J. 316, 318 (1985).
Congress amended the bank bribery statute again in 1986. Act of Aug. 4, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
370, 100 Stat. 779. Those modifications attempted to reduce confusion and required the federal
regulatory agencies to establish guidelines for complying with the provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 215(d)
(Supp. IV 1986).
90 See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (Supp. IV 1986). To be convicted of receiving stolen bank property, a
defendant must now merely know that the property was stolen. Prior cases required that the defend-
ant knew property was stolen from a finahcial institution. diGenova & Belfiore, supra note 89, at 731.
91 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Section 1341 provides in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice ... places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing, shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Id. Federal prosecutors first used the mail fraud provision to prosecute misconduct in financial insti-
tutions that was not otherwise covered by federal criminal statutes relating to financial institutions.
Section 1341 of Title 18 U.S.C. has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a
first line of defense. When a "new" fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud
statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon,
until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.
United State v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974), quoted in Best, Bank Fraud Statute Reaches Broad
Variety of Conduct, INSIDE LITIGATION, June 1987, at 24.
Although "particularized" provisions now apply to financial institution fraud, prosecutors con-
tinue to use mail fraud charges, often in addition to charges under banking related statutes. The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO) defines mail fraud as a "racketeer-
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fraud,92 conspiracy, 93 RICO,94 and other crimes. 95 Insider criminal mis-
ing activity," but the provisions do not include bank fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (Supp. IV
1986).
The Supreme Court, however, limited application of § 1341. In 1974, the Supreme Court
found no violation of that section when a fraudulent credit card scheme had been completed before
mailings occurred. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974). That interpretation narrowed the
scope of § 1341; federal prosecutors "viewed Maze as a major impediment to using § 1341 in bank
fraud prosecutions." Best, supra, at 25.
The Supreme Court again narrowed the scope of § 1341 in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct.
2875 (1987). The Court held that the mail fraud statute does not prohibit fraudulent schemes to
deprive individuals of intangible rights. Since the McNally scheme involved intangible rights rather
than a loss of money or property, the Court reversed McNally's conviction.
Justice Stevens noted in dissent that courts for decades have interpreted the mail fraud statute
to prohibit schemes by public officials and private individuals to defraud others of intangible rights.
Id. at 2883 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., id. at 2883 n.1 (cases construing the mail fraud statute
to prohibit schemes to deprive individuals of intangible rights). Congress agreed with the dissent
and set aside the result of McNally in 1988. See Act of Oct. 21, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4508 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
Although the McNally limitations no longer hinder future prosecutions for conduct that oc-
curred after the effective date of § 1346, the McNally holding limits prosecutions for conduct in
financial institutions prior to that date. The standard operating procedures of financial institutions
are also limiting the application of § 1341. Institutions now frequently use private courier services,
negating the applicability of the mail fraud statute. Dennis & Chafetz, The Crime Control Act of 1984
and its Application to Financial Institutions, 39 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 23, 24 (1985). See also Best,
supra, at 25.
Even with the judicial scope limitations and changing practices of institutions, mail fraud re-
mains a significant prosecutorial weapon against misconduct in financial institutions. See, e.g., United
States v. Bates, 852 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1988) (prosecution for mail fraud and misapplication of bank
funds). See generally Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 18 Dug. L. REv. 771 (1980); Coffee, The
Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the "Evolution" of a White Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRiM. L.
REv. 1 (1983).
92 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). The relevant portion of the statute provides the following:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television com-
munications in interstate or foreign commerce, any . . .signals . . .for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
Id. Wire fraud combines with mail fraud to offer a "first line of defense" against fraud. Murakami,
White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, Mail and Wire Fraud, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 623 (1987). See
supra note 91.
93 Misconduct cases often involve charges of conspiracy. Such charges generally require four
elements: "1) an agreement; 2) to achieve an illegal goal; 3) with knowledge of the existence of the
conspiracy, and with the intentional and actual participation in the conspiracy; and 4) an overt act in
furtherance of the illegal goal." Branden, White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, Conspiracy, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 459, 462 (1987). A general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982), and
substantive provisions in various federal statutes prohibit conspiracy. Financial institution miscon-
duct cases may include conspiracy charges under either type of provision. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1982) (general conspiracy provision) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982) (RICO conspiracy provision).
See, e.g., United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.) (prosecution for conspiracy and misapplica-
tion of bank funds), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1983).
94 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act provides both criminal penalties
and civil remedies for violations of its provisions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (1982).
RICO prohibits a person from engaging in activities which affect interstate or foreign com-
merce, including: (1) using income received from a pattern of racketeering to acquire an
interest in an enterprise; (2) acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering; (3) conducting or participating in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering; and, (4) conspiring to commit any of the above offenses.
Burke, White-Collar Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, RICO, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 651, 657 (1987) (foot-
notes omitted). Federal prosecutors have brought charges of RICO violations in cases involving
financial institution misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, Crim. No. 88-53-N (E.D. Va.Jan. 3,
1989) (denial of post-trial motions following conviction of wire fraud, bank fraud, bankruptcy fraud
and racketeering). See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
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conduct cases often involve charges of several offenses, utilizing specific
banking statutes and general federal statutes.96
Although prosecutors now have numerous federal criminal statutes
applicable to misconduct in financial institutions, prosecution difficulties
remain. Investigation and prosecution backlogs of insider misconduct
cases present a significant problem. 97 An insufficient number of FBI in-
vestigators and U.S. attorneys in many districts contributes to those
backlogs. 98 Additionally, the time required to investigate and prosecute
each financial institution misconduct case has generally increased.99 Na-
tional offices emphasize such cases, but not all local FBI and U.S. attor-
ney's offices follow that policy. 100 Some local law enforcement offices
give financial institution misconduct cases lower priority, hindering effec-
tive prosecutions.' 10
ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (1988); Blakey & Gettings, supra note
73 (general discussions of criminal RICO charges).
95 Prosecutors in cases of financial institution misconduct may bring charges under various other
federal statutes, including the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). That Act "pro-
hibits travel in interstate or foreign commerce to further unlawful gambling, prostitution, extortion,
bribery or arson, as well as illegal transactions involving liquor or narcotics." Shapiro, White-Collar
Crime: Fourth Survey of Law, Travel Act, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 735, 735 (1987).
96 Misconduct contributing to the failure of Penn Square Bank in Oklahoma resulted in charges
of misapplication of bank funds, false entries in bank records, conspiracy and wire fraud. See United
States v. Patterson, 827 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Patterson, 782 F.2d 68 (7th Cir.
1986); United States v. Lytle, 677 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Lytle, 658 F. Supp.
1321 (N.D. Ill. 1987). For a description of the circumstances leading to the Penn Square Bank fail-
ure, see M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY (1985) and P. ZWEIG, BELLY UP (1985).
For financial institution misconduct cases involving charges of several offenses, see United
States v. Copple, 827 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1987) (prosecution for misapplication of bank funds, false
entries in bank records, false statements in loan applications, and conspiracy), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1046 (1988); United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260 (7th Cir.) (prosecution for conspiracy and misap-
plication of bank funds), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1983); see also Corporate Crime at a Glance: Dallas
Bank Fraud Task Force Prosecutions, CORP. CRIME REP., Feb. 13, 1989, at 15.
97 The subcommittee found that "[flinancial institution fraud and embezzlement cases, espe-
cially those involving $ 100,000 or more are clearly overwhelming the criminal justice system." 1988
REPORT, supra note 49, at 140.
98 Id. The subcommittee highlighted several districts where bank fraud cases have become inac-
tive because the district is experiencing a shortage of FBI investigators and prosecutors. Areas ex-
periencing severe backlog problems include California, Texas, Florida and Wyoming. Id. at 141-44.
99 Bank fraud matters usually require a substantial review of documents and lengthy techni-
cal interviews.... Within the past few years, the amount of losses in bank fraud matters has
increased drastically with a commensurate increase in the complexity of the investigation
required. The number of major cases has also increased substantially, with the highest
percentage of increases falling in the area of million dollar losses and bank failures. There
has also been a significant increase in those cases involving bank officers and executives.
The time required to investigate and prosecute those cases involving large losses, complex
schemes, substantial document review, and bank executives.., is dramatically longer than
the typical teller defalcation case.
Fraud and Abuse by Insiders, Borrowers, and Appraisers in the California Thrift Industry: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. 429-30 (1987) [hereinafterjune 1987 Hearing], quoted in 1988 REPORT, supra note 49,
at 140.
100 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 140.
101 A California district exemplifies the problem. Prosecutors have done nothing regarding a
completed FBI investigation and prosecutive recommendation concerning misconduct of former
savings and loan association officers and directors. Id. at 145. "mhe case inexplicably remains in
limbo." Id. Similar cases are also receiving low priority treatment. Id.
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III. Efforts to Curb Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct
As Representative Fernand St. Germain noted at a hearing on in-
sider misconduct, "the best laws we can devise are worthless unless we
match our rhetoric with adequate resources to achieve an effective law
enforcement, regulatory and legislative structure."' 0 2 It is that cohesive
structure that has been so elusive.
A. The Mechanics of Detecting and Prosecuting Insider Abuse
1. Detection
Insider abuse or criminal misconduct in financial institutions can be
detected in a variety of ways. Early detection usually occurs during a
routine examination conducted by a banking agency.' 03 Examiners find
insider abuse difficult to detect because it is rarely evident from the re-
ports they analyze. Additionally, the involved insider generally takes af-
firmative steps to conceal the abusive practices.' 0 4 Banking agency
examiners face a difficult task, yet they are the government's "only or-
ganized means of routinely detecting insider misconduct in financial in-
stitutions."' 10 5 The frequency with which financial institutions are
examined depends on the supervising agency.' 0 6 Not all federal banking
agencies meet their examination schedules. 0 7
If insider misconduct is not detected early, the financial institution
may fail. Investigators often uncover insider misconduct during an in-
102 November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 7 (statement of Representative Fernand J. St.
Germain, Chairman, House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs).
103 Examinations focus on a broad range of factors and result in a rating of an institution's overall
condition. An institution's condition is expressed as a "CAMEL" rating.
The acronym CAMEL represents the five categories in which banks are rated by examiners
- Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. The composite rating rep-
resents the overall status of the bank and takes into account the ratings in all five categories.
A 1-rated bank is in the best of health while a 5-rated bank is very near failure.
OCC STUDY, supra note 20, at 3 n.2.
104 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 51.
105 Id.
106 The federal banking agencies examine financial institutions with varying frequencies. The
FDIC policy requires annual examinations of institutions with CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, or 5. Institu-
tions with CAMEL ratings of I or 2 are to be examined by the FDIC "as often as necessary," but at
least every 36 months. November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 150.
The Federal Reserve System examines state member banks which are experiencing problems
twice each year. Healthy state member banks are examined by the Federal Reserve and, in some
cases, a state banking agency annually. Id. at 293-94.
The Federal Home Loan Bank System policy requires an examination of healthy institutions
every 18 months. Problem institutions are to be examined annually. Id. at 252.
The OCC does not have a policy requiring examinations at specified intervals. A supervisory
strategy is determined for each institution. "The frequency of examinations is commensurate with
the need for examination as determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 418.
107 The FDIC failed to meet its examination schedule for the majority of problem banks. 1988
REPORT, supra note 49, at 63. The agency conducted timely examinations on 75% of healthy banks.
Id.
Because of the OCC examination policy, see supra note 106, statistics on OCC schedules are
unavailable. The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Federal Reserve System are meeting
their established examination schedules. November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, at 207, 294.
Various factors can prevent an agency from performing a scheduled examination. In the 1988
Report, the subcommittee highlighted inadequate examiner staffing levels as a significant problem.
1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 62-74. Insufficient examiner compensation contributed to high ex-
aminer turnover rates, compounding the difficulties. Id.
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vestigation following insolvency, whether or not the misconduct directly
caused the failure. Efforts must be made to pursue the perpetrators of
the fraud or misconduct regardless of the time or method of discovery.
2. Investigation and Prosecution
A financial institution examiner records suspected insider abuse on
the examination report and informs the institution's management of the
suspected activities.108 The banking agency may pursue civil enforce-
ment actions at that time.' 0 9 When criminal activity is suspected, the ex-
aminer requests the institution to make a criminal referral to the Justice
Department. If the institution fails to submit a referral or if the examiner
feels that the activity is sufficiently "serious," the examiner will make an
agency referral.110 United States attorneys, utilizing investigative help
from the FBI, decide if prosecution is appropriate."'
Misconduct investigations also occur when a financial institution be-
comes insolvent. Those investigations proceed at the same time the ap-
propriate banking agencies are taking action concerning the institution's
financial problems. An attorney who has served as fee counsel for the
FSLIC describes the typical environment at an institution closed because
of insolvency:
When an institution is closed you have a multitude of forces coming
together in usually what is a period of confusion. The association
is throughly [sic] padlocked; you have Pinkerton or other guards com-
ing in with boxes and identification badges and so on. You have a fee
counsel who comes swooping in, often to an association with which he
has never had any substantive prior contact. The FBI is often in the
same position. The U.S. attorney is often in the same position.
Outside fee counsel often don't know whether some preliminary crimi-
nal investigation is already ongoing. They have no idea. There is no
system in place to integrate all these forces.' 1' 2
The activities at insolvent institutions do not reveal a coordinated detec-
tion and investigation effort.
Problems exist throughout the entire detection, referral and prose-
cution system. Although the banking agencies no longer use different
and sometimes inadequate referral forms,' "3 they often delay submitting
108 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 82.
109 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
110 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 82. Similar referral processes are followed at each federal
banking agency. The regional or district office legal staff reviews the examiner's findings. If the
evidence warrants referral, the legal staff sends a criminal referral to the U.S. attorney and a copy to
the FBI. Id.
111 Id. at83.
112 June 1987 Hearing, supra note 99, at 377-78, quoted in 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 99.
113 Prior to 1984, each banking agency used a different referral form. Important information was
often omitted. 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 85-87. The Interagency Bank Fraud Working Group,
see infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text, designed a uniform criminal referral form which in-
cludes all necessary information. 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 92. All federal banking agencies
and most financial institutions now use the uniform referral. Id.
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criminal referrals until after an institution has closed. 114 The agencies
keep poor records of the referrals actually submitted and they rarely
check on the status of the referrals unless the U.S. attorney or the FBI
requests assistance. 15 Delays in prosecution,116 exacerbated by a lack of
cooperation from the banking agencies, further hinder a timely attack on
insider misconduct. Banking agencies and law enforcement divisions
have failed to demonstrate a concerted effort to detect, investigate and
prosecute insider abuse."17
B. Congressional Recognition of Problem
Increasing financial institution failure rates and the uncoordinated
response detailed above drew the attention of Congress. The Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House
Committee on Government Operations targeted insider abuse and crimi-
nal misconduct in financial institutions for hearings in 1983 and 1984.118
Because the banking agencies compiled no statistics on the effects and
costs of insider misconduct, the subcommittee conducted an in-depth
study of bank and loan association failures. 119 The study revealed a
"deeply disturbing picture of a banking industry that suffers too many
failures due to insider fraud, a bank supervisory system that frequently
fails to detect, investigate or penalize such fraud, and a law enforcement
system that frequently fails to prosecute it.'' 120 The 1984 Report recom-
114 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 94. Delays in making criminal referrals harm investigative
efforts. When San Marino Savings & Loan failed, requiring $260 million from the FSLIC, the agency
did not notify the FBI when examiners first uncovered suspected fraud.
[Tihe FBI's investigation shows that the agency had notice of possible criminal fraud almost
two years before the institution failed. Rather than refer the case to the FBI, or even com-
pare quarterly audits, the regulatory agency did not make a referral until the institution
closed. The delay created severe document control problems and made a complex investi-
gation even more difficult.
June 1987 Hearing, supra note 99, at 369-70, quoted in 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 96. United
States attorneys indicate that the effectiveness of their actions would be greatly increased if FBI
agents were involved in the investigation before the institution closed, or at least at the time of the
failure, rather than later. 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 94.
115 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 83. Simply passing information along does not complete a
referral. The referral process "extends to agencies' promoting and monitoring referrals they have
already made." Id. Other government agencies, such as the U.S. Postal authorities and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, actively follow up on their referrals. Id. at 83-84.
116 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
117 Coordination problems are "compounded by the simple fact that civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion and the decision making process are independently exercised by [the banking agencies] on the
civil side and [by the Department ofJustice] on the criminal area." June 1987 Hearing, supra note 99,
at 386, quoted in 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 99.
An FSLIC fee counsel noted that coordination between banking agencies and law enforcement
offices needs improvement. "[lit is our experience that such coordination is random and ad hoc, at
best, and at times leads to an assumption by both sides that the other is taking care of the problem
with the end result of nothing being done." Id.
118 See Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct by Bank Officers, Directors, and Insiders (Part 2): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Federal Response to Criminal Misconduct by Bank Officers, Directors, and
Insiders (Part 1): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
119 1984 REPORT, supra note 38, at 4. The subcommittee studied the 105 bank and loan associa-
tion failures that occurred between January 1980 and June 1983. Id. The subcommittee also sur-
veyed certain criminal referrals and banking agency documents. Id. at 5.
120 Id at 5.
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mended various actions to be taken by the banking agencies, the Justice
Department, and Congress. 121
Because of the steadily increasing failure rates of financial institu-
tions, Congress in 1987 again focused on the adequacy of the federal
response to insider abuse and criminal misconduct. 122 The 1988 Report,
based on the findings of those 1987 hearings, revealed improvements
in certain areas, such as communication on the national level. 123 Defi-
ciencies remain in the use of enforcement actions and interagency
coordination. 124
C. Recent Efforts to Curb Insider Misconduct
Since the subcommittee's initial report in 1984, further attempts
have been made to curb insider abuse and criminal misconduct. The In-
teragency Bank Fraud Working Group increased communication, at least
on the national level.' 25 Members of the group meet monthly; they have
worked on specific recommendations made in the 1984 Report and they
have shared information on current abusive schemes. 126 The group's
work reflects progress toward a coordinated effort, but the federal bank-
ing agencies seem more willing to rely on the interagency group than to
take action themselves. 127 An effective attack on insider abuse and crimi-
nal misconduct in financial institutions requires a determined approach
within each agency and interaction among agencies on more than a na-
tional level.
Efforts in two geographic areas demonstrate such a comprehensive
approach. An interagency task force in Illinois, the Bank Regulators' Fo-
rum, attempts to improve communication among regulatory agencies, in-
121 See id. at 17-25.
122 See November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20;June 1987 Hearing, supra note 99.
123 See 198R REPORT, supra note 49, at 120-21.
124 See supra notes 61-70 & 112-17 and accompanying text.
125 The Working Group consists of representatives from the federal banking agencies (FDIC,
FHLBB, Federal Reserve, OCC, and the National Credit Union Administration), the FBI, the Crimi-
nal Division of the Department ofJustice, and the Farm Credit Administration. 1988 REPORT, supra
note 49, at 120.
126 Id. at 120-21. The Working Group has addressed several recommendations given in the 1984
Report. The group developed a uniform criminal referral form. To aid communication, the group
compiled and distributed to financial institutions lists of banking agency personnel responsible for
criminal referrals, investigations and prosecutions. Id. at 120. The group also initiated the Signifi-
cant Referral Tracking System (SRTS), a computer system designed to track certain criminal refer-
rals both from financial institutions and banking agencies. Id. at 122. (The SRTS is not yet fully
operational and it contains serious defects.) Id. at 122-25.
The Working Group developed guidelines to be issued by each agency as required by the
amended bank bribery statute. Efforts of the group have also led to the Justice Department's in-
creased emphasis on cases involving misconduct in financial institutions. Id. at 120.
127 Id. at 121. As Chairman Barnard of the subcommittee noted,
[a] task force, to me, is a body that gets in there and gets the job done; and I will be very
honest with you, I am very disappointed. I don't see the meetings taking place like they
should be. I just wonder if it's nothing but window dressing .... We haven't seen any
dramatic actions, even in the changes in the laws. What little change in the laws that have
come about to strengthen the criminal prosecution system and detecting crime has come
from.. . Congress.
June 1987 Hearing, supra note 99, at 178-79, quoted in 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 121.
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vestigative agencies, and the U.S. attorney's office. 128 The Bank
Regulators' Forum schedules meetings approximately every two months
where members discuss "mutual concerns," including criminal referrals
made by the banking agencies and interpretations of various statutes. 129
Another local effort involves a task force concentrating on investi-
gating and prosecuting misconduct in the large number of recent finan-
cial institution failures in Texas. In Dallas, the Savings and Loan Fraud
Task Force consists of attorneys, FBI agents, FHLBB examiners and In-
ternal Revenue Service agents. 3 0 The task force "examine[s] the inter-
connections among a network of thrift owners, officers, and directors and
their key borrowers."1-31 Staff shortages and other difficulties have hin-
dered the effectiveness of this task force,' 3 2 but the group illustrates a
possible approach to a regional problem. According to Attorney General
Richard Thornburgh, the Dallas task force provides "an example of the
kind of action that can be taken."' 33
Both types of task forces provide opportunities for the communica-
tion necessary to efficiently attack insider abuse and criminal misconduct
in financial institutions. Such insider misconduct does not present a
unique need for interagency coordination. Abusive and criminal activi-
ties in financial institutions, like organized crime,
encompass, geographically and statutorily, the entire spectrum of en-
forcement and prosecutorial jurisdiction. In order to break up the
criminal organizations, cooperation of all agencies concerned is essen-
tial. A law enforcement system is needed which provides for some
form of central direction and coordination and yet which allows for the
advantages of specialization.13 4
The task forces in Illinois and Dallas meet those requirements. The Bank
Regulators' Forum addresses interagency coordination from a routine
operations perspective while the Savings and Loan Fraud Task Force il-
lustrates a framework to coordinate regional problems.
Additional groups, with appropriate modifications, should be
modeled after those in Illinois and Dallas. Groups similar to the Bank
128 Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, formed the Bank Regula-
tors' Forum in 1984 after observing a severe lack of communication in a bank fraud case involving
insiders at institutions supervised by the FDIC, the FHLBB, and the OCC. 1988 REPORT, supra note
49, at 125-26. The Bank Regulators' Forum includes representatives from the FDIC, the FHLBB,
the OCC, the FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, the'U.S. attorney's office, the state commissioner of
banks and the state commissioner of savings and loan associations. Id. at 126.
129 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 126.
130 The task force includes "8 prosecutors from the Fraud Section [of theJustice Department], 2
assistant U.S. attorneys, I special assistant U.S. attorney (a FHLBB attorney), numerous FHLBB
examiners, 20 FBI agents and 5 IRS agents." 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 127.
131 Kahler, supra note 76, at 8, col. 1.
132 Zipser & Harlan, The Fraud Patrol: Flashy Federal Posse Pursuing S & L Abuses Bungles Efforts in
Texas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1989, at 1, col. 1. "Budget cuts, low morale, and ineffective strategy have
plagued" the Dallas task force. Id. The force has not operated with a separate budget. Most of the
attorneys assigned to the task force continue to have other duties and few of the investigators pos-
sess experience in "pursuing labyrinthine paper trails." IdE
133 Id. For a list of Dallas task force prosecutions, see Corporate Crime at a Glance: Dallas Bank Fraud
Task Force Prosecutions, supra note 96.
134 The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime, 6 COLUM.J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 496,
497-98 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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Regulators' Forum should meet regularly in other cities across the coun-
try. The banking agencies generally agree that such groups would assist
efforts to halt insider abuse and criminal misconduct. Unfortunately, the
agencies have not all expressed a willingness to work toward the forma-
tion of local groups. The FDIC recommends forming the groups but
refuses to actively organize local groups.1 3 5 The Federal Reserve Board
also prefers not to be involved with organizational work.1 3 6 The OCC
advocates forming such local groups and has pledged its support.13 7
IV. Conclusion
Insider abuse and criminal misconduct have contributed to a signifi-
cant number of recent financial institution failures. Those insider activi-
ties drain millions of dollars each year from federal deposit insurance
funds and weaken the banking system. American taxpayers are bearing
not only the burden of banking industry losses, but also the burden of
the industry's insider misconduct. Civil actions and criminal sanctions
could place liability on the wrongdoers, but federal banking agencies and
law enforcement divisions have been unable to coordinate an effective
attack against insider misconduct in financial institutions. Billions of dol-
lars in losses, combined with intangible damage and an inability to stop
the harm, present a "crucial point or situation in the course of things." 138
That is a crisis.
The existence of a crisis does not signal the end of the banking sys-
tem. Rather, the situation illuminates the critical need for action. Statis-
tics demonstrate that the current attack on insider misconduct is failing
along with the financial institutions. President Bush noted that "ltfor the
future, we will seek to achieve a safe, sound and profitable banking sys-
tem."13 9 To achieve that goal, federal banking agencies must all demon-
strate a serious commitment to eradicate insider abuse and criminal
misconduct in financial institutions. Local banking agency and law en-
forcement offices must increase communication and coordination of ef-
forts. The use of task forces corresponds to those needs. Such groups
"concentrate personnel on a specialized task in order to focus and coor-
dinate investigations and prosecutions on a targeted area."' 140 Increased
activity by the existing national group and expansion of local groups
135 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 128. The FDIC points to the U.S. attorneys' offices as the
appropriate organizer of local groups. Id.
136 Id. at 129. The Federal Reserve Board placed responsibility for coordinating local communi-
cation on local FBI and U.S. attorney offices. The Board advocated that the law enforcement offices
organize networks using contact lists, "eliminating the need to convene, on a formal basis, a local
level working group or task force." November 1987 Hearing, supra note 20, quoted in 1988 REPORT,
supra note 49, at 129.
137 1988 REPORT, supra note 49, at 129. "The OCC fully endorsed the concept and intends to
explore how it could establish such groups on a local level." Id.
138 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (5th ed. 1979).
139 President s News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, supra note 4.
140 N. ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 133 (1986).
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would promote the communication and coordination necessary for the
banking system to emerge intact from this crisis.
Renae V. Stevens
